



Director of
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ISRAEL-LEBANON: Israeli Reassessment

The cease-fire in Beirut was marred yesterday by only minor violations. The Israelis are showing more caution about attacking West Beirut. [redacted]

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Only minor firing incidents occurred yesterday in Beirut. According to the Israeli military command, six Israeli soldiers were wounded on Tuesday night in an ambush near Alayh. [redacted]

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Stocks of Captured Weapons

[redacted] the value of Syrian and Palestinian arms, ammunition, and other military equipment captured by the Israelis in Lebanon could reach several billion dollars. Israel's Industry and Trade Minister disclosed yesterday that some of the captured equipment would be sold abroad to help offset the cost of the war. Israel has already begun incorporating a limited number of the captured weapons into its own inventories. [redacted]

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Arab Summit Canceled

Tunisian President Bourguiba canceled the Arab Summit that was scheduled to begin today in Tunisia after failing to receive the two-thirds majority necessary to convene a summit. Only seven of the 22 Arab League member states agreed unconditionally to attend. The summit was generally welcomed by radical Arab states, while most conservative states equivocated. [redacted]

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Nonaligned Communique

As many as 90 members of the nonaligned movement are to meet in Cyprus for the next three days to discuss the crisis in Lebanon, as requested by PLO Chief Arafat.

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Comment: The PLO probably will receive unanimous and unconditional support at the conference. Although many moderates are not comfortable giving strong backing to the PLO [redacted] they believe they must go along if they want Arab support on other issues. [redacted]

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SPAIN-PORTUGAL-NATO: Talks on Alliance Commands

//Spain's integration into NATO threatens to complicate the debate over Alliance commands.//

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Foreign Minister Pereira met with his Spanish counterpart last weekend in Madrid to discuss command relationships and other effects of Spanish entry. The Portuguese Foreign Ministry reportedly believes relations with Spain are heading for a difficult period as strife over NATO command issues spills over into other areas.//

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//Lisbon is assuming Spain will not accept a subordinate command within the Iberian Atlantic Area-- currently under a Portuguese admiral--and is proposing an alternative new command for Spain. It would include some waters under Portuguese command and extending from Gibraltar to Spain's Canary Islands. Portugal would expect compensation through expansion of the Iberian Atlantic Command to include the Azores, now under US command.//

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Comment: //Portugal's fears probably have been heightened by Spanish Defense Minister Oliart's announcement in June that Madrid intended to lobby in NATO for a fourth major command comprising peninsular Spain, Gibraltar, the Balearic and Canary Islands, and the Spanish enclaves in North Africa.//

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//NATO, however, is unlikely to make fundamental changes in its command structure. The Spanish Navy is aware of this and probably would accept an arrangement similar to the Portuguese proposal so long as Portugal did not receive more responsibilities in the Atlantic than the capabilities of its Navy warranted. The other services, however, may resist such a compromise.//

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//Greece, Turkey, Italy, and France also are concerned about the effect of Spain's membership on NATO commands in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. Turkey's NATO representative, for example, recently linked Ankara's approval of any new arrangements resulting from Spain's accession to future decisions regarding Greek and Turkish command relationships in the Aegean.//

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SPAIN: Center Democrats Elect a President

The election on Tuesday of Landelino Lavilla as president of the governing Center Democratic Union is not likely to unify the party. [redacted]

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Only 144 of the 260 members of the party's Political Council voted for Lavilla. After the election, Lavilla claimed that he had received full powers to remodel the cabinet, negotiate electoral alliances with other parties, and determine who serves in the key posts and committees that shape party policy and review candidates for office.

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Comment: The election reflects the poor state of party unity, and Lavilla's extensive powers may not enable him to prevent further defections. His willingness to consider allying with the Socialists will trouble party conservatives, some of whom may soon switch to new Liberal and Christian Democratic parties. [redacted]

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After being passed over for the leadership post himself, former Prime Minister Suarez may try to launch a new party, but he probably would not be able to attract many followers. His aim would be to ally with the Socialists, who are likely to win the next election. Suarez, however, does not have enough influence with right-of-center power brokers to be useful to the Socialists. [redacted]

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Elections are widely rumored for November, and potential defectors may have little time to form new parties. By August, the threat of defections will begin to diminish, and Lavilla may be able to take stronger action despite his reputation for indecisiveness. [redacted]

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GHANA: Prospects for a Coup

Potential for a coup is increasing as dissatisfaction mounts over the government's inability to stem economic decline and maintain public order. [redacted]

[redacted] after six months in power the regime's indecision on economic and other problems and resultant shortages of essential goods has eroded its public support. Enlisted men--head of state Rawlings's base of support--also are increasingly impatient with the lack of economic progress. Officers, who are harassed and intimidated by the lower ranks, cannot control their troops.// [redacted]

The murder of several high-ranking moderate officials earlier this month is widely believed to be the work of radicals in the regime. The resulting climate of fear has prompted several politically prominent Ghanaians, including some in the administration, to plan on leaving the country. [redacted]

Comment: Rawlings's opponents have not been able to agree on common goals and timing, and they have been further hampered by a lack of funds and organization. Moreover, no effective leader has emerged to unite them. If the obstacles could be overcome, however, a coup attempt probably would face little opposition from the demoralized and disorganized security apparatus. [redacted]

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CHINA-US: Attacks on Supporters of Taiwan

The Chinese media have increased their attacks on those in the US urging close ties with Taiwan and have focused on recent statements by conservative groups in the US urging President Reagan to maintain US support for Taiwan. According to a commentary in the *People's Daily*, these groups seek a "two-Chinas" policy and have "no scruples about destroying Sino-US relations completely." [redacted]

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Comment: The tone and arguments of Beijing's criticism are unchanged from previous Chinese commentary. These attacks are yet another warning that the continued sale of arms to Taiwan would damage US-Chinese relations.

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TURKEY: Cabinet Resignations

Deputy Prime Minister Ozal, the architect of Turkey's economic recovery as well as the Finance and Housing Ministers, relinquished their posts yesterday. [redacted]

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Comment: Ozal's position had become tenuous following the financial collapse three weeks ago of a major brokerage firm. This set off a temporary panic in the banking community and rekindled criticism of Ozal's market-oriented austerity program. The military leadership probably will stick with Ozal's programs because they have stabilized the economy and renewed confidence among Western donors. His resignation, the first major change in the civilian cabinet, could result in a relaxation of the government's tight money policy and a delay in Ozal's plan to restructure the large state sector of the economy. [redacted]

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SPECIAL ANALYSIS

LEBANON: The PLO in Beirut

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Most key PLO leaders and at least 5,000 Palestinian fighters are in Beirut. The fighting forces of the larger PLO groups are organized along conventional military lines. The smaller groups are more loosely organized. The PLO forces have a few tanks and a variety of individual and crew-served weapons, including artillery, antiaircraft weapons, and rocket launchers. [redacted]

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The PLO is an umbrella organization made up of nine fedayeen--or guerrilla--groups. PLO chief Arafat's Fatah is the largest, but he exercises only nominal control over the others. His influence stems as much from his personal prestige and political skills as from his control of Fatah's superior military and financial resources. [redacted]

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//At least three of Arafat's chief deputies in Fatah are with him. They include hardliner Salah Khalaf, who used to head the terrorist Black September organization; the more moderate Khalid Wazir, who supports political as well as military tactics for gaining Palestinian rights; and key adviser Hani Hassan, who favors a negotiated settlement of the Palestinian issue.// [redacted]

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Leaders of the Other PLO Groups

//Apart from Arafat's Fatah entourage, two other veteran Palestinian leaders are actively involved in Beirut deliberations over PLO strategy. George Habbash heads the Marxist Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which is committed to overthrowing conservative regimes as well as destroying Israel but emphasizes the latter.// [redacted]

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//Nayif Hawatmah heads the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which also is Marxist but less militant than the PFLP and generally favors the political over the armed struggle. Hawatmah has been considered the "Soviets' man" in the PLO, but in view of Moscow's weak response to the PLO's troubles, his relations with Moscow may have suffered.// [redacted]

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//The second-largest PLO group, Saiqa, is controlled by Syria. About half its forces are thought to be in West Beirut along with some senior commanders. The political leadership probably is in Damascus. Other small groups that are likely to have some fighters in Beirut include two Iraqi-sponsored groups, one that follows a pro-Iraqi line, and another with close ties to Libya.// [redacted]

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//Although the various leaders have shown remarkable unity in the current crisis, each would have to approve any agreement. Arafat has wide authority to negotiate on behalf of the PLO, [redacted] but the support he now commands could evaporate if he were to negotiate a settlement unacceptable to the others.// [redacted]

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Military Forces

//PLO ground forces have never been a single military force. Member groups have their own armed contingents of varying size and effectiveness, generally operating independently of each other.// [redacted]

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//In addition, there are two separate Palestine Liberation Army organizations. One, responsive to the PLO and Fatah, was located primarily in southern Lebanon. The other is controlled by Syria and is stationed in West Beirut.// [redacted]

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There probably are between 5,000 and 6,000 regular fighters from the PLO groups in West Beirut. Most were stationed there before the invasion, but perhaps as many as 1,000 managed to retreat from southern Lebanon after the onslaught began. Reports of up to 8,000 fighters in West Beirut may reflect the arming of noncombatants or local recruiting from among Palestinian civilians. [redacted]

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In addition to the Palestinians, there are other armed groups in West Beirut, some of which would resist an Israeli move into the sector. Lebanese Muslim militias of various persuasions probably have between 1,500 and 2,000 troops. Syrian regulars number between 600 and 1,000, and the Syrian-controlled PLA between 2,000 and 3,000. [redacted]

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It is not known how much heavy equipment the Palestinians have been able to move into West Beirut. They almost certainly have more than an adequate supply of individual weapons and ammunition. The Palestinians have for years been building a large stockpile of arms in Beirut, probably similar to the huge caches the Israelis have found in southern Lebanon. [redacted]

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